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Petr HEDBÁVNÝ* – Ondřej SCHNEIDER** 
1. Introduction
Perhaps surprisingly, fiscal policy has emerged as the most pressing eco-
nomic policy issue in both developed and emerging countries in the early
21st century. The 1990’s saw a considerable consolidation of fiscal positions
in most countries. The European Union, prodded by the desire of its mem-
bers to qualify for eurozone membership, experienced very robust consoli-
dation whereby the year 2000 was the first (and last) in which the eurozone
ran a balanced budget. The United States propelled by its burgeoning eco-
nomy had even managed to switch its budget into surplus by 2001. Even
emerging economies seemed to be on their way to a more responsible fiscal
policy, as they cut their public debt from an average of 68 % of GDP in 1993
to less than 60 % in 1997 (IMF, 2003).
However, in thelate 1990’sand early years of thenew millennium thepic-
ture changed dramatically. The EU countries’ penchant for fiscal restraint
vanished as they had attained the prized euro membership and the euro-
zone is now back to the bad old days as its average public deficit stood at
-2.2 % of GDP in 2002 and is expected to remain at 2.5 % of GDP in 2003
and 2004 (EC, 2003). The US suffered an economic slowdown coupled with
heightened security expenditures and its public budgets experienced one
of the most rapid deteriorations in history as its deficit in 2003 will reach
5–6 % of GDP. Following Argentina’s collapse, emerging countries have be-
gun to accumulate deficits again and by 2002 the average debt of 32 emer-
ging markets represented in an IMF study stood at 71 % of GDP (IMF,
2003).1
Transition countries have always been a little different. They started
the 1990’s with high public spending, highly distortive and arbitrary tax
systems and with a radical re-adjustment of their economies. The fiscal
pressures that resulted from this mix were enormous and most transition
countries, sooner or later, experienced severe fiscal problems. As a group,
however, the Central and Eastern European countries managed to cut
the public debt from more than 100 % of GDP in 1992 to less than 60 % in
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derwriting in the case of Poland and fiscal consolidation in Russia powered
by high oil prices.
More recent trends among transition countries are more worrisome, how-
ever. The eight Central and Eastern European countries that are about to
join the European Union – Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lit-
huania, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia – have recorded public deficits at
about 4 % of GDP. Some of the most advanced countries in this group have
seen deficits as high as 10.4 % of GDP (Slovakia in 2000) or 9.2 % of GDP
(Hungary in 2002). The average (unweighted) deficit in 2002 of these eight
countries stood at 4.1 % of GDP, i.e. on an accelerating debt/GDPratio path.2
The Czech Republic has experienced one of the most dramatic fiscal de-
velopments. Long cherished for its prudent fiscal stance, the country be-
came a pariah in 1997 and 1998 when hidden imbalances emerged.3 It ex-
pects to reach the highest deficit among EU members-to-be in 2003 (7.6 %
of GDP) and according to its government’s official fiscal strategy Czech pub-
lic budget deficits should remain the highest among this group until 2006.
The Czech government does not expect to satisfy the EU’s fiscal criteria of
3%   GDP deficit as the maximum even by 2007.
The editors of the journal Finance a úvûr – Czech Journal of Economics
and Finance have thus had many reasons to devote this volume of the jour-
nal to the issues of fiscal policy with particular attention to the Czech Re-
public. This brief paper opens the volume with an analysis of the role of fis-
cal rules and their advantages and pitfalls. The paper illustrates that
the Czech fiscal framework is insufficient and requires a rigorous overhaul.
The following paper by Bezdûk, Dybczak and Krejdl analyzes Czech struc-
tural budget deficits. The authors use two alternative methods for estima-
ting thestructural budget deficits, as applied by theEuropean Central Bank
and by the OECD. They show that both methods yield very similar results
for the Czech Republic. The Czech cyclically adjusted budget position has
been worsening, and the Czech fiscal policy has been highly pro-cyclical,
exaggerating business cycle swings.
The structural balance of public budgets always reflects the expenditure
and revenue sides of a budget. The two following papers analyze these in
turn. Michal JeÏek shows that the Czech pension system, the largest ex-
penditure program, is highly inefficient and its overhaul, namely by intro-
ducing private savings, would significantly improve both the fiscal position
of the state and the well-being of pension system participants. Any future
adjustment in public budgets will have to deal with the public pension
scheme and JeÏek’s paper indicates a possible route for reform.
Salí, Schneider and Zápal4 analyze the Czech tax system, namely taxa-
tion of personal and corporate income. The authors show that the low la-
bor flexibility allows relatively high taxation of labor. They also estimate
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2 Data from the individual countries’ Pre-accession Economic Programmes – see the EU web
page.
3 For details see (Drabek – Schneider, 2000) or (Schneider – ·tûpánek, 2001).
4 This paper is published in Czech, as the issue is very relevant for Czech policy makers and as
the underlying research was done in Czech.the tax burden that falls on capital and labor and show that capital pro-
bably bears more than a proportional tax burden in the Czech Republic.
The authors argue that this leads to under-investment and a lower long-
-term growth rate.
The last paper, authored again by Bezdûk,DybczakandKrejdl, shows very
lucidly that the Czech public budgets face immense challenges rooted in
the country’s fast aging society. As the authors demonstrate, age-related ex-
penditures (pensions, health care) will explode unless a radical reform is
embraced and tax revenues may well decline as the labor force stagnates
and then shrinks.
We  believe that the five papers in this volume fill, at least partially,
the long felt gap in the Czech economic literature. Fiscal policy does have
a crucial impact on the Czech Republic’s economic developments and it in-
deed has become the single biggest threat to long-term prosperity of
the country. We would like to believe that the papers in this volume will
mark a turning point in the fiscal policy discussion in the Czech Republic
and will stimulate further research.
The rest of this introductory paper is organized as follows. First, we pro-
vide a rationale for introducing fiscal rules that would bind govern-
ment’s hands. Second, we give a basic classification of quantitative (nume-
rical) fiscal rules, describe the most discussed rules and provide a brief as-
sessment of them. In the third part, we discuss institutional reforms that
may prevent excessive deficits. We conclude with a brief discussion of
the current and proposed fiscal rules in the Czech Republic.
2. Rationale for Fiscal Rules
If the 1990’s might have led some economists to believe that governments’
bias toward deficits5 was overcome, the current situation proves them
wrong. Governments are as conducive to deficit as ever. The economic the-
ory, and practice as well, shows that permanent and high deficits lead to
excessive public debt, crowd out private investments, increase interest ra-
tes and make the government macroeconomic policy highly inflexible. Thus
it is highly relevant to look at policy alternatives that may prevent exces-
sive budget deficits.
As discretionary fiscal policy tends toward pervasive deficits, an apparent
candidate is a rule-based system whereby fiscal policy would be subject to
an external limit. While this limit might vary (annual deficit, total debt,
cyclically adjusted deficit...) it inevitably restricts the freedom of policy-ma-
kers and limits the politicians’ reign. This makes fiscal rules very contro-
versial and susceptible. What government would like to be subject to an
external rule? As the current row about France’s breach of the Stability 
and Growth Pact illustrates all too vividly, politicians despise any external
authority that may impose its preferences over the politicians’ tendency to
set budget deficits according to their (rather short-term) goals.
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5 For a detailed discussion of the governments’ tendency for deficits see (Kydland – Prescott,
1977) or (Buchanan – Wagener, 1977).And still, were not the governments similarly beleaguered 20 or so years
ago when monetary policy was taken from them and vested in independent
central banks? As politicians, especially in Europe, were not trusted to run
prudent monetary policy, the power to set interest rates and intervene in
currency markets was transferred to non-elected technocratic institution,
with some oversight from parliaments. This transfer has proved to be suc-
cessful, as independent central banks have been able to run monetary po-
licy in a less myopic and more predictable way than politicians.
Why should fiscal policy be any different? Certainly, fiscal decisions lie at
the heart of any government policies. Politicians win or lose elections on
their promises to increase spending on particular programs or to introduce
tax preferences. Inefficient as it often is, this political process should not be
eliminated. Government will always have the ultimate authority to set ta-
xes and spend revenues. However, they do not need to do so without any li-
mits. As we show below, it may be perfectly compatible with democracy for
governments to accept overall limits on spending and set their structure
according to its political preferences. Or governments may be told only what
a deficit (or surplus) must be and then decide on the amounts to raise
through taxes and spend on various expenditure programs. Such a mecha-
nism would let governments redistribute from the rich to the poor as much
as they deem fair and would let them finance defense and all other expen-
ditures programs. It would only expose governments to hard budget con-
straints.
It is evident that in the long-term everybody benefits from a prudent fis-
cal policy, as it spares the economy from high interest costs, crowding-out
effects and other negative consequences of high deficits. However, in
the short-term, every government may be tempted to use a fiscal stimulus
to gain politically. This is a parallel of the argument of time-inconsistency
of government monetary policy that eventually led to a separation of mo-
netary policy from the government. If the government is not the best po-
licy-maker in the monetary policy area, why should it be unconstrained in
the other main macroeconomic policy tool, fiscal policy?
Indeed, even now many countries pursue different fiscal rules.6 The Uni-
ted States uses nominal caps on discretionary spending while Britain uses
the “golden rule”. Perhaps most famously, the European Union has adopted
the Stability and Growth Pact that limits national budget deficits and can
even punish countries that exceed the limit of 3 % of GDP.
The main objective of such rules is to reinforce the credibility and pre-
dictability of macroeconomic policies. In other words, fiscal rules are usu-
ally aimed at mitigating the democratic government’s tendency to abandon
previous policy commitments. Thus fiscal rules are particularly helpful if
the government is not able to persuade economic actors that it will conduct
a prudent fiscal policy although the government is committed to do so.
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6 In this paper a fiscal policy rule means a permanent constraint on fiscal policy, expressed in
terms of an indicator of overall fiscal performance, such as the government budget deficit, bor-
rowing, or debt (i.e. we follow the definition of Kopits and Symansky (1998)). A rule is often ex-
pressed as a numerical target for a public budget deficit or debt as a share in GDP.Fiscal rules are sometimes criticized for being redundant, for represen-
ting an unnecessary bureaucratic obstacle and also for being conducive to
misuse via “creative accounting”. However, even as an imperfect tool, fiscal
rules can play a positive role. They introduce a long-term horizon to the go-
vernment’s often shortsighted decision making. Fiscal rules also “guide” fi-
nancial markets, the ultimate source of fiscal discipline for governments,
as strict transparency requirements are identified as a common denomi-
nator of efficient rules7. Without such a guide, financial markets react to
a change in fundamentals with a considerable time lag and they impose
high costs (sudden capital outflow, high risk premium) on the government
that departs from a prudent fiscal policy.
In order to guide fiscal policy successfully, fiscal rules should be forward
oriented and should incorporate increasing pension entitlements stemming
from aging populations.8 Fiscal rules should also encompass various quasi-
-fiscal transfers and programs that are used to mask the true size and ef-
fects of fiscal policy. Some authors also argue that fiscal policy rules should
take into account the risk of fiscal revenues and expenditures and use more
sophisticated financial methods to estimate the “value at risk” of a fiscal
policy (Barnhill – Kopits, 2003).
Taking account of thepreceding criticism, anideal fiscal policy rule should
have – according to Kopits and Symansky (1998) – the following properties:
it must be (i) well-defined in terms of the indicator to be constrained, in-
stitutional coverage and escape clauses, (ii) transparent regarding accoun-
ting conventions, forecasts and reporting practices and (iii) simple. Furt-
hermore, it should be (iv) adequate with respect to the ultimate goal and
(v) flexible so that in the case of an unexpected macroeconomic shock it does
not hinder the achievement of the goal. Finally, the fiscal rule like any rule
has to be (vi) enforceable, (vii) internally consistent and in accordance with
other policies and, finally, should be (viii) reinforced by structural reforms
so that the whole fiscal framework is not seriously endangered by increa-
sing budget liabilities (e.g. implicit pension debt).
There are two main types of fiscal rules: (a) numerical rules, such as per-
manent constraints on the budget balance, borrowing or debt of central and
local governments and (b) “institutional” proposals aimed at curing the cau-
ses of excessive deficits by promoting responsible fiscal behavior. We deal
with these two groups in turn.
3. Quantitative Fiscal Rules
Numerical (quantitative) fiscal rules can be divided into four main cate-
gories: budget balance rules, expenditure rules, borrowing rules and debt
rules. We will concentrate on the first two categories.
A budget balance rule can be defined as the requirement to meet overall
balance, current balance (i.e. the golden rule) or operating balance each
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7 See (Craig – Kopits, 1998) on transparency in fiscal policy.
8 More on the issue of implicit pension debt in (Schneider, 1999) and also (Bezdûk – Dybczak –
Krejdl, 2003b).year. The requirement can be set for a number of years, and then the rule
deals with a structural (i.e. cyclically-adjusted) balance. A further modifi-
cation is the permanent balance rule, which requires that the inflation-and-
-real-growth adjusted permanent government budget be in balance. We will
turn our attention to two proposals recently discussed in the literature:
the golden rule and the permanent balance rule.
3.1 The Golden Rule
Under the golden rule9 borrowing is allowed to finance public investment,
that is:
bt * + kt = 0 (1)
in each period t, where b* denotes overall budget balance and k stands for
(capital) public investment. The budget is therefore split into current spen-
ding and investment spending.
The benefits of the golden rule are the biggest in the periods in which cur-
rent generations have to shoulder the costs of new investment and pay in-
terest on past debt at the same time. The dual approach to current and in-
vestment expenditures facilitates the financing of expensive projects (e.g.
infrastructure investment) while the costs are spread across generations.
The golden rule also mitigates the efficiency loss stemming from distortio-
nary taxation which accompanies the tax rate fluctuations over time.
Major criticism of the golden rule can be summarized into the following
three points. First, the rule should take into account depreciation (δ):
bt * + kt – δ = 0 (2)
since to achieve tax smoothing over time, net public investment needs to be
spread across generations. However, this would pose additional difficulty
since commonly agreed estimates of amortization are unavailable.10
Second, a dual approach to expenditures may result in excessive expen-
diture on physical assets, as these would be exempted from the official bud-
get deficit. Other expenses (e.g. education) would be discriminated against
and the golden rule could lead to a worsening of public good provision. Fi-
nally, the existence of two budgets with unequal treatment in terms of de-
ficits might stimulate creative accounting on the part of government. Such
practices would probably negatively affect the country’s growth prospects –
see (Craig – Kopits, 1998).
3.2 Permanent Balance Rule
The permanent balance rule proposed by Buiter and Grafe (2002)11 re-
quires that the inflation-and-real-growth adjusted permanent government
budget be in balance.
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9 The following discussion is based on (Buti et al., 2003).
10 New Zealand fiscal rules represent a unique effort to include depreciation estimates into go-
vernment budget reports. No other country has followed the New Zealand example so far.
11 This subchapter draws substantially on (Buiter, 2003).The permanent balance rule can be expressed in the general govern-
ment’s intertemporal budget constraint:
g ∞ j 1 + ns g
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bt–1 ≤ΣΠ –––––  (τj + θj – gj) = ΣΠ –––––   σt (3)
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where b is the share of total government interest-bearing debt B
g in GDP,
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ns is the growth rate of real GDP,
rs is the domestic real interest rate,
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θ ≡ ––– is the share of total gross financial returns earned by the go-
vernment on its capital stock Θ in GDP, Y
G
g ≡ ––– is the share of government spending G in GDP.
Y
Budget surplus as a fraction of GDP, σ, can be expressed as σ≡τ g + θ – g.
Thus the general government is solvent if its gross financial debt is not
greater than the present discounted value of current and future primary
surpluses. The rule is a tax smoothing one. Its authors accentuate that it
allows for any departures of current public spending from permanent pub-
lic spending. Therefore automatic fiscal stabilizers can operate freely and
symmetrically.
However, the permanent balance rule requires unbiased estimates of future
tax receipts and spending levels, which are difficult (if not impossible) to es-
timate without reliable estimates of future social and political preferences.
Furthermore, the rule requires anticipation of future real growth rates of
the economy. The rule is thus exposed to political risks, as it is tempting for
a government to raise its official “forecasts” to justify high current spending.
For transition countries another worry is relevant, i.e. that a high vola-
tility of GDP growth may make a permanent balance rule very unoperati-
onal, as the volatile growth rates render any estimates of business cycle po-
sition and long-term trends very difficult.12
3.3 Expenditure Rules
Expenditure rules refer to budgetary items the government can control
and be made responsible for since expenditure is less responsive to busi-
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12 Indeed, Coricelli and Ercolani (2002) argue that the high output volatility of transition count-
ries’ GDP makes it more likely that they will find it more difficult to comply with the current
Stability and Growth Pact rules. On the other hand, Bezdûk et al. (2003a) show, that the Czech
Republic budget has a lower sensitivity vis-à-vis GDP fluctuations.ness cycles than revenues. Expenditures should grow in line with a consis-
tent and sustainable trend and the business cycle will demonstrate itself
in the revenue side. Also, expenditure rules allow automatic stabilizers to
work and thanks to their simplicity they are easily defined and monitored.
Expenditure rules can either apply to nominal or real targets. In terms of
coverage they can set a limit on primary expenditure, wage (and pension)
expenditure, and also debt service.
Recently, Coricelli and Ercolani (2002) have proposed the introduction of
an expenditure rule intended for the enlarged European Union. The rule tar-
gets structural deficit close to balance and focuses on nominal expenditure.










where: cRs is the component of revenues linked to the cycle at time t,
sR are revenues not linked to the cycle at time t,
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Yt+1 is the percentage change of potential output,
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t+1 is the inflation target,
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t+1 is the nominal value of expenditures, excluding unemployment
benefits, for the year t+1, decided at time t and
εcR;Y stands for the elasticity of the cyclical component of revenues
with respect to GDP.
The targeted level of expenditures excludes unemployment benefits,
which further lowers sensitivity of the targeted variable to cyclical move-
ments. The rule accounts for cross-country differences in the growth of po-
tential output. Therefore a country with a higher growth of potential out-
put can run higher deficits during an economic downturn.
Buti et al. (2003) note that expenditure rules cannot prevent deficit and
debt increases resulting from tax cuts. That is why they suggest comple-
menting the expenditure rule with a deficit or debt rule. In the case of
a country heavily in deficit, the expenditure rule should entail a consolida-
tion factor whereby expenditures would grow at a lower rate than (the long-
-term) rate of revenues, thus eventually eliminating a deficit.
4. Institutional Fiscal Reforms
Institutional fiscal reforms try to modify the framework in which fiscal
policy is carried out and thus limit the causes of excessive deficits. Most ty-
pically, institutional reforms may substantially redefine policymakers’ po-
wers or take into account the progress of structural reforms. In an extreme
version, this may entail shifting apart of thefiscal policy setting from thego-
vernment to an independent authority. More timidly, institutional (proce-
dural) reforms may strengthen the position of the finance ministry to spen-
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of domestic financial markets to shocks and thus decrease the possibilities
to burden domestic financial markets with excessive debt.14
There are several proposals for deep institutional reforms – for example
(Wyplosz, 2001), (Eichengreen, 2003) and (Gleich, 2003). They are often in-
spired by an institutional setup of monetary policy whereby the policy-ma-
king is insulated from politicians’ short-term preferences.
4.1 Fiscal Policy Committee – Wyplosz (2001)
Wyplosz defends the notion that counter-cyclicality of fiscal policy may be
suppressed by artificial and excessively rigid numerical rules. He suggests
concentrating on building institutions that create the proper incentives for
and set the right constraints on politicians. In order to credibly combine
long-term commitments with short run flexibility in the realm of fiscal po-
licy, he calls for the creation of an independent body with a clear mandate
and insulated from the “temptation and pressures of political life”, a body
similar to the monetary policy committee.
Wyplosz underlines the distinction between the macroeconomic side of fis-
cal policy and the allocative and structural aspects of fiscal policy. He main-
tains that only the latter aspects need to be decided in the political arena.
A newly created institution, the Fiscal Policy Committee (FPC) would be
responsible for the macroeconomic side of fiscal policy. The FPC would set
thelevel of budget deficit (surplus) ahead of thegovernment budgetary cycle
and the constraint on budget balance would be a binding one. It would de-
cide on the basis of a debt sustainability constraint defined over a number
of years. The FPC would be accountable to parliament.
Wyplosz also discusses an institutional arrangement similar in spirit to
the FPC. The Court of Wise Persons would differ from the FPC in one cru-
cial thing: its decisions would not have the power of law. Wyplosz conclu-
des that such internal peer pressure may only work in very open societies
with high moral standards in politics.
Buti et al. (2003, p. 15) question the feasibility of Wyplosz’s proposal. They
maintain that “[...] it is hard to conceive that a minister of finance would
delegate part of fiscal policy authority to an independent agency”.
4.2 Two-tier Stability Pact – Eichengreen (2003)
Eichengreen (2003), like Wyplosz (2001), focuses on fundamental fiscal
institutions rather than transitory fiscal outcomes. He identifies the follow-
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13 Procedural rules concern the presentation, adoption and execution of government budgets.
Hierarchical procedures where the finance ministry dominates are conducive to greater fiscal
discipline than vertical ones. Limiting the parliament’s power to amend the government’s bud-
get proposal has the same effect, but is rather inconsistent with democratic principles.
14Afast-rising government debt is potentially dangerous for the domestic banking sector if there
is a low degree of diversification of government debt on the side of domestic banks. Buti et al.
(2003) recommend assigning the government’s debt a risk greater than zero and placing them
in the corresponding risk category. Secondly, they call for making the so-called large exposure
directive (no more than 25 % of the bank’s capital can be lent to a single borrower) applicable
to the government, as well. Not surprisingly, both these proposals meet strong resistance from
banks as they would increase their costs.ing problematic institutions, which can potentially endanger the health of
fiscal policy: public enterprises, unfunded pension systems, labor market
and social welfare programs and budget-making institutions that create
common pool and free rider problems.
Eichengreen looks for an alternative arrangement to current numerical
thresholds in the Stability and Growth Pact, which lack clear economic ra-
tionale and are excessively uniform for European Union member count-
ries. As a potentially feasible solution, he proposes to supplement current
numerical rules with an index of institutional reform. The respective bi-
nary indices would mirror the development of future pension system lia-
bilities, the (non-) existence of appropriate fiscal institutions and the state
of labor market reforms. A country would then be exempt from the 3 per
cent limit on current budget deficit if the country’s pension system, fiscal
institutions and labor market arrangements were “sustainable enough”.
Should it not be the case, the country would be subject to the 3 per cent
ceiling.
The indices constructed by Eichengreen are partly based on indicators de-
veloped by Hallerberg, Strauch and von Hagen (2001). Eichengreen conce-
des that such an institutional index is context specific. Thus he proposes
that an independent committee of fiscal policy experts would define the in-
dex (indices). The committee would also have the right to adjust the index,
should the index lose some rationale over time.
Gleich (2003) contributes to this approach by creating an institutional in-
dex of budgetary processes and applies it to transition countries. He shows
that countries with institutions conducive to coordination in budgetary po-
licy, a strong position of the finance ministry and limited autonomy of spen-
ding ministries (as Estonia) tend to have lower budget deficits than count-
ries with many competing spending ministries and a strong parliamentary
role in budget-making (as Romania).
5. European Fiscal Rules and the Czech Fiscal Quagmire
The fiscal rules discussed above could be used either in a national or in-
ternational context. The latter requires, on top of the individual count-
ries’ adherence to the chosen fiscal rule, coordination among the count-
ries that make the international entity. The most obvious example of
an international fiscal rule mechanism is the European Union’s Stability
and Growth Pact (SGP). The Pact, established as a supporting mechanism
for the new European currency, the euro, was meant to introduce and ma-
intain fiscal discipline to European governments that wanted to use
the euro.
However, the Pact has been criticized for its rigidity15 and it remains to
be seen whether the European Commission that is formally vested with
the right to reprimand countries for running too high a deficit will have
the power to take on the two largest eurozone countries, i.e. Germany and
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15 See, for example, (Buiter, 2003).France. France is the first country that is set to exceed the 3 % of GDP li-
mit for budget deficits in three consecutive years. This should, in theory,
trigger a harsh reaction from the Commission that may culminate in im-
posing France huge fines. However, in this respect the SGP probably fails
on one of the key requirements for an ideal fiscal rule: it is not enforceable.
France seems determined to ignore the Pact rules and there is no inde-
pendent power that would make France adhere to the rules.
The main weakness of the SGP lies in its asymmetric nature: it prevents
governments from running a deficit above the 3 % of GDP threshold in bad
times but it does not penalize countries that run lower deficits during eco-
nomic expansion.16 There has been no shortage of proposals on how the SGP
could be changed. We have discussed some of them above. The European
Commission itself modified the SGP as it stresses that “structural deficits”
are to be considered, as opposed to nominal values.
Many economists outside the Commission have suggested various re-
forms to the European budgetary process. The proposals vary from funda-
mental, institutional changes in line with the Fiscal Policy Committee’s pro-
posal discussed above17 to parametric changes in the existing framework
(Buti et al., 2003). European countries are instead turning to “creative
accounting” techniques. Germany and France briefly advocated exempting
defense spending from the Pact considerations. Italy favors “ring-fencing”
of European investment programs that are supposed to kick-start the let-
hargic European economy. The European Investment Bank would become
responsible for financing projects that are now included in national bud-
gets.
Czech economists and politicians have a very particular comparative
advantage in this respect. The Czech Republic has been most innovative in
creating off-budget institutions and programs similar to the proposals of
Italian Finance Minister Gulio Tremonti. We have seen hospital banks, sta-
bilization funds, development funds, health-care spin-offs and many other
tools that helped to maintain a mirage of fiscal prudence until the late
1990’s when the whole structure collapsed. The costs to the taxpayer have
been indeed dire, as a plethora of off-budget institutions and programs, of-
ten hidden from official financial reports and always prone to inefficient
operation, have accumulated debt approaching 20 % of GDP.18 These costs
slowly dissipate into official deficits and hamper the Czech fiscal position
even now as Bezdûk et al. show in the paper in this issue (2003a).
The Czech experience thus warns against too creative fiscal arrange-
ments. Using the country’s complex fiscal set-up, the Czech government
could have avoided a fiscal consolidation well until 1997 as the government
often used off-budget institutions to finance expenditure programs that
should have been included in the official budgets.
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16 Formally, the SGP calls for close to balance or slightly surplus budgets over the medium-term
but there has been no tangible effort to reach balanced or surplus fiscal positions in the late
1990’s when the European Union member-countries enjoyed strong economic growth.
17 See also a modified golden rule for the European Union proposed by Blanchard and Giavazzi
(2003).
18 For details see (Drabek – Schneider, 2000) or (Schneider – ·tûpánek, 2001).At thesame time, theCzech experience highlights theimportance of trans-
parency in fiscal policy and general government activities. Any government
may be tempted to manipulate its fiscal books, either by a straightforward
“cooking-up” of numbers or by using more sophisticated “estimation” me-
thods. There are two possible ways to remedy this government tendency.
A comprehensive set of fiscal rules that would compel the government to
fully account for its net wealth and to account for full future costs of its cur-
rent policies would be the “first-best” solution.
However, given the complexity of such a set of rules, a “second-best” so-
lution of a highly transparent, but unsophisticated rule, as, for example,
a nominal limit for budget deficits, could be considered. Such a rule shares
all the features with the dreaded Stability and Growth Pact, but it does
help to expose the government to a virtual hard budget constraint. More-
over, if adhered to for several years, such a nominal rule may become ent-
renched and thus become supportive for a prudent, anti-cyclical fiscal po-
licy.
In this respect, the current proposals19 to introduce medium-term fiscal
plans and incorporate them into the traditionally one-year budgets in
the Czech Republic represent a step in the right direction, but remain “pro-
cedural” rather than “institutional”. The Czech Republic’s abysmal stan-
dards of fiscal policy execution, whereby Parliament often dominates go-
vernment, off-budget institutions spring out without any thought given to
their self-financing abilities, and long-term issues of health care and pen-
sion provision are all but ignored, requires a more substantial reform.
The Czech Republic is one of the few countries that have no permanent
fiscal rule whatsoever. There is no limit on budget deficit, no limit on
public debt, no limit on tax revenues, and so on. The Czech Republic
should, we argue, adopt a permanent fiscal rule limiting its deficit by
a share of GDP (3 % of GDP is an obvious candidate). Such a rule should
be accompanied by a requirement to run a balance budget over a busi-
ness cycle.
This broad rule, inspired by the EU’s Stability and Growth Pact must be,
however, supported by two other institutional changes. First, budgetary pro-
cedures must be changed and made binding. As it stands now, the Czech
government ignores the budget at the moment it is approved in the Parli-
ament. There are no procedures that would force the government to adjust
its budgetary policy if the actual budget differs significantly from the ap-
proved budget. The government does not report to the Parliament until
thebudgetary year is well over and forgotten.20This lack of procedures must
be remedied if the government is to run a predictable and sustainable fis-
cal policy.
Second, the Czech Republic, and other transition countries as well, must
find a flexible rule that will allow them to eliminate their huge budget de-
ficits in an orderly manner. A modification of the expenditure rule as pro-
posed by Coricelli and Ercolani (2002), with a regular elimination of a part
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19 See the Czech government fiscal reform reported at the Finance Ministry web: www.mfcr.cz.
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sed” only 18 months later when nobody cares about the “old” budget anymore.of the deficit (say a 1/2 percentage point annually) would be most appropri-
ate. Although such a modification would conflict with one of the require-
ments of fiscal policy rules, i.e. its permanent character, it would facilitate
the shift toward a sustainable fiscal policy.
6. Conclusions
In this paper we have demonstrated that fiscal policy has not yet lost its
deficit bias. We argued that time inconsistency, present in all government
actions, demonstrates itself in fiscal policy as strongly as it used to in mo-
netary policy. We thus argued that the fiscal policy framework should, and
could, be changed in a way emulating the separation of monetary policy
from regular government intrusion.
The EU’s Stability and Growth Pact is an attempt to incorporate fiscal
rules into the European Union’s economic policy setting. Some may argue
that the SGP complicates the current economic recovery in Europe, as it li-
mits (or rather is supposed to limit) governments’arbitrary fiscal policy sti-
muli. But that is a price worth paying for longer-term stability and pru-
dence of European fiscal policy. The first storm should not wreck the SGP
Project. Governments would be better advised to put their fiscal house in
order, slash high expenditures and run surplus budgets. This would allow
them to tolerate swings in fiscal position generated by business cycles. And
it would also allow them to prepare for a fast increase in expenditures as
baby-boomers head for their retirement and will draw public pensions and
use public health care programs enthusiastically.
The argument for transition countries is more nuanced. These countries
need fiscal discipline even more than “old” European Union members, as
their fiscal systems are more susceptible to quick accumulation of debt. This
vulnerability stems from higher volatility of budget revenues21 and from
the transition countries’ still immature political system that tolerates non-
-transparent fiscal shenanigans.
Concentrating on the Czech Republic, we argued that it requires a sub-
stantial reform of fiscal rules. The country should adopt a permanent fis-
cal rule accompanied by a change of budgetary procedures and a rule that
will guide it as the Czech Republic eliminates its high budget deficit.
Fiscal policy has become, as we argued above, a threat to long-term mac-
roeconomic stability in most developed countries. The current regimes,
where fiscal policy is mostly vested with elected officials, are flawed, as they
lead to a deficit-biased fiscal policy. It is time to reconsider the proper role
for arbitrary annual election-influenced political decision-making and to re-
evaluate which aspects of fiscal policy should be institutionalized outside
the politicians’ reign.
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The paper provides an analysis of the role of fiscal rules. The authors first pro-
vide a rationale for the existence of fiscal rules, namely to avoid a governmental
bias toward budget deficits. The paper then surveys existing fiscal rules and ana-
lyzes their applicability in the context of the Czech Republic. The authors argue
that the institutional arrangement of fiscal policy should mirror the arrangement
that has emerged as regards monetary policy, namely a certain separation of po-
wers in which an independent body would be responsible for setting the overall bud-
get deficit level. In the case of the Czech Republic, the authors argue that the country
needs a simple and transparent fiscal rule rather than a more sophisticated and
seemingly more appropriate rule.
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